This paper looks for evidence of adverse selection in the relationship between primary insurers and reinsurers. We test the implications of a model in which informational asymmetry-and therefore, its negative consequences-decline over time. Our tests involve a data panel consisting of U.S. property-liability insurance firms that reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners during the period 1993-2012. We find that the amount of reinsurance, insurer profitability, and insurer credit quality all increase with the tenure of the insurer-reinsurer relationship.
Introduction
This paper empirically explores some implications of adverse selection for the demand for reinsurance. Typically, the primary insurer ceding the risk (the "cedant") will have better information about the underlying risk than the reinsurer. The extent to which information is asymmetric depends upon the nature of the underlying risk. For example, we would expect less information asymmetry concerning high frequency, low severity risk such as automobile physical damage than low frequency, high severity risk such as commercial liability. The greater the information asymmetry, the greater is the cost of adverse selection to the ceding insurer. However, adverse selection costs may be mitigated through long-standing relationships, joint risk sharing, or improved information flows. Therefore, we may expect differences in insurer risk policy and strategy depending on the nature of the underlying risk written by the ceding insurer.
A key feature of the Jean-Baptiste and Santomero model is that informational asymmetry-and therefore, its negative consequences-decline over time because of long-term cedant-reinsurer relationships. This particular feature is not unique to Jean-Baptiste and Santomero; indeed, there exists a substantial literature on learning and asymmetric information in insurance markets, 6 which theoretically and empirically examines the implications of informational asymmetries falling over time as a result of repeated contracts. 7 Repeated contracting may also be motivated by moral hazard. For example, Rubinstein and Yaari 8 show that by offering repeated insurance contracts featuring discounts to insureds with favourable claims histories, such discounts enable both insurer and insured to counteract the inefficiency that arises from moral hazard. Doherty and Smetters 9 provide a dynamic model of the reinsurance market and show (empirically as well as theoretically) that reinsurers use loss-sensitive premiums as a strategy for mitigating moral hazard, a result that is not inconsistent with Rubinstein and Yaari's theory. Consequently, even in the absence of adverse selection, one could reasonably expect an empirical confirmation of Jean-Baptiste and Santomero's first hypothesis; that is that cedants demand more reinsurance as the length of the cedant-reinsurer relationship increases. However, without a formal theory that also links moral hazard with cedant profitability and bankruptcy risk, it is not clear that less moral hazard would necessarily imply higher profitability and lower bankruptcy risk for cedants.
10
Jean-Baptiste and Santomero take the cedant-reinsurer relationship as given and rely instead upon relationship sustainability as the mechanism that separates risk types in the long run. Moreover, their analysis suggests that contingent pricing schemes (loss-sensitive contracts and large deductibles) decrease in importance as the length of the cedant/reinsurer relationship increases (as is implied by our empirical results). A researcher with access to a reinsurer's proprietary book of business, including pricing and contract design information, could potentially test the sensitivity of our results to the relationship assumption and estimate the combined effect of contract design a priori and sustainability ex post. 6 For example see Kunreuther and Pauly (1985) , D'Arcy and Doherty (1990) , Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) , de Garidel-Thoron (2005) , and Cohen (2012) . 7 When considering the learning and asymmetric information literature, the study closest to ours is by Cohen (2012) . Cohen uses a unique panel data set of an Israeli auto insurer's transactions with repeat customers. She finds that (1) repeat customers with good (bad) claims histories are more likely to stay with (flee from) the same insurer, and (2) the insurer and customers with good claims histories both benefit; the insurer earns higher profit whereas the customers enjoy lower premiums. Although we (unlike Cohen) lack data on earned premiums for cedants, the notion that cedants enjoy lower reinsurance premiums is implicit in Hypothesis 1; the reason why cedants demand more reinsurance as the expected length of the relationship increases is because reinsurance becomes less expensive as the costs of adverse selection are mitigated. 8 Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) . 9 Doherty and Smetters (2005) . 10 See Cohen and Siegelman (2010) for an excellent survey of the empirical literature on the disentangling of moral hazard and adverse selection.
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Factors other than informational asymmetries per se could also possibly contribute towards insurers increasing their demand for reinsurance as well as becoming more profitable and solvent over time. An important example is financial innovation, with the emergence of risk-linked securities such as catastrophe bonds, risk swaps, industry loss warranties, and sidecars. 11 Cummins notes that risk-linked securities complement the reinsurance market by providing additional risk-bearing capacity for the financing of catastrophic risk. However, such instruments may also act as substitutes for catastrophe reinsurance; for example see Bouriaux and MacMinn. 12 As these markets evolve over time and improve their efficiency, the use of risk-linked securities would also likely affect insurer profitability and solvency in addition to the extent to which insurers rely upon traditional reinsurance products for managing risk. Furthermore, technological innovation 13 substantially mitigates information problems encountered by the ceding insurer and reinsurer alike. For example, reinsurers can readily observe Global Positioning System coordinates and use cat risk models to accurately assess the frequency and severity of catastrophe-related claims for real property that is part of a ceding insurer's book of business. To the extent that insurers rely upon reinsurers to help them select and manage risk more effectively, technological innovation in and of itself could positively influence reinsurance demand as well as insurer profitability and solvency in the ways described by JeanBaptiste and Santomero.
Nothwithstanding the various caveats raised above, we focus our efforts on testing the Jean-Baptiste and Santomero hypotheses after controlling for various factors that are known from previous studies to influence reinsurance contracting behaviour. We analyse panel data consisting of U.S. property-liability insurance firms that reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) during the period 1993-2012. By implementing empirical tests of the Jean-Baptiste and Santomero hypotheses, our paper provides an important contribution to the empirical literature concerning the impact of adverse selection on the operation and industrial organization of insurance firms and markets.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section of the paper, we present our data and methodology. In the third section of the paper, we present our empirical results and a series of robustness tests. Concluding remarks are provided in the fourth section of the paper. 11 For example see Cummins (2008) . 12 Bouriaux and MacMinn (2009) . 13 For example in the forms of so-called "big data" and data analytics; see McAfee and Brynjolfsson (2012 
Data and methodology

Measuring the demand for reinsurance
In this study, the unit of analysis is the individual ceding insurer, or cedant. Our sample consists of insurers that are either affiliated with insurance groups or exist as standalone, unaffiliated single companies.
14 Thus, we do not study the reinsurance contracting behaviour of insurance groups per se.
Following the lead of previous empirical studies of the demand for reinsurance, 15 we use the following definition for ceded reinsurance (referred to here as Best, 1995 Best, -2012 .
14 In our unbalanced panel consisting of 34,111 firm-years, 72 percent of these observations involve group affiliates, whereas the remaining observations involve unaffiliated single companies (see Table 1 ). 15 For example Mayers and Smith (1990) , Garven and Lamm-Tennant (2003) , Cole and McCullough (2006) . 
Thus, CededReinsurance measures the proportion of total business premiums written by the cedant that it cedes to its reinsurers in a given year.
16 By construction, CededReinsurance is bounded from below at 0 and from above at 1, where 0 indicates that no reinsurance is ceded and 1 indicates the ceding insurer reinsures 100 per cent of its total business premiums.
Our source of data for the ceded reinsurance variable is Schedule F, Part 3 of the annual statement. There, reinsurance transactions between cedants and reinsurers are documented according to the NAIC company codes for these companies. However, since a majority of reinsurers listed in this schedule do not have NAIC company codes, we identify them according to their Federal Employer Identification numbers. Furthermore, Schedule F, Part 3 provides 14 different codes that categorize the nature of each reinsurance transaction; for example, whether the reinsurer is authorized or unauthorized, 17 whether it is a domestic or foreign group affiliate or unaffiliated company, etc. Two of these 14 categories document authorized and unauthorized pooling arrangements in which participation is compulsory; all other reinsurance categories involve discretionary transactions, which is what is being modelled here. Since the theory upon which this paper is based involves reinsurance decision-making where participation is discretionary, we omit compulsory reinsurance from our sample.
Modelling reinsurance contracting behaviour
Although theory does not imply a specific method for determining whether a cedantreinsurer relationship is long or short term in nature, we capture this effect by creating a "reinsurance sustainability index" called Sustainability. The first step in calculating Sustainability involves creating 16 separate 5-year rolling windows: 1993-1997, 1994-1998, … , 2008-2012 . From Part 3 of Schedule F, we count how many years within each 5-year window that a given cedant cedes reinsurance to each of its reinsurers, and then compute the mean and standard deviation for each cedant's reinsurer count distribution. Thus, Sustainability ¼ mean of the reinsurer count distribution standard deviation of the reinsurer count distribution + 1 :
The reinsurance sustainability index given by the ratio shown in Eq. (2) is essentially the inverse of a coefficient of variation. The highest possible value for the numerator of this ratio is 5. This occurs when the cedant cedes reinsurance to the same group of reinsurers throughout the course of a given 5-year window. We refer to the average of the reinsurer count distribution as persistency. The lowest possible value for the denominator of this ratio is 1. This also occurs when the insurer cedes reinsurance to the same group of reinsurers throughout the course of a given 5-year window.
18 The higher (lower) the standard deviation, the lower (higher) is the consistency of the cedant's relationship with a given reinsurer. Thus, cedants that typically have long-term relationships with the same set of reinsurers receive high reinsurance sustainability index scores by virtue of having high levels of persistency and consistency. On the other hand, cedants that frequently change their reinsurance programmes receive low reinsurance sustainability index scores (since persistency and consistency are typically low in such cases).
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The Appendix numerically illustrates how differences in reinsurance contracting behaviour give rise to different reinsurance sustainability index values for cedants. In the first example, an insurer cedes reinsurance to the same set of three reinsurers within a 5-year window of time. Thus the mean of the reinsurer count distribution (μ count1 ) is 5, the standard deviation (σ count1 ) is 0, and the reinsurance sustainability index is μ count1 /(σ count1 +1) = 5/(0+1) = 5. However, in the second example, another cedant is constantly changing its reinsurance programme with three different reinsurers; in the first 2 years, it only deals with reinsurer A, then switches to reinsurer B in the third year, and subsequently deals only with reinsurer C in the fourth and fifth years. In this example, the mean of the reinsurer count distribution (μ count2 ) is 1.67, the standard deviation (σ count2 ) is 0.47, and the reinsurance sustainability index is μ count2 / (σ count2 +1) = 1.67/(0.47+1) = 1.13. 18 Since the standard deviation of the reinsurer count distribution will be zero if the cedant always cedes reinsurance to the same group of reinsurers, we add 1 to the standard deviation so as to ensure that there never is division by zero. 19 As a robustness check, we also calculate a reinsurance sustainability index (called Sustainability3) for 18 3-year rolling windows: 1993-1995, 1994-1996, … , 2010-2012 . Since the reinsurer count distribution used for Sustainability3 is calculated over 3-year rather than 5-year rolling windows, this implies that Sustainability3 is defined over the closed interval [0, 3] , whereas the 5-year version of Sustainability (subsequently referred to as Sustainability5) is defined over the closed interval [0, 5] .
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While the reinsurance sustainability index indicates whether the cedant is engaging in short vs long-term reinsurance contracting, an important related question concerns the degree to which the cedant tends to have focused vs diffuse contractual relationships with its reinsurers. In order to capture the effect of reinsurance concentration, we construct a Herfindahl index (called ReinsuranceHerfindahl) for each cedant year in our sample. This variable enables us to determine how focused or diffuse the cedant's relationship is with a given set of reinsurers. In cases where the ceding insurer contracts with a small (large) number of reinsurers, then the reinsurance Herfindahl index approaches 1 (0).
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Asymmetric information in reinsurance contracts
As shown by Rothschild and Stiglitz, 21 full insurance contracts induce adverse selection and other information asymmetry problems, including moral hazard. They show that contract design (including partial as well as full insurance coverage) can partially correct for these concerns, but will still not be first best as some insureds will obtain less coverage than they desired. In our model, one potential correction for this problem is that learning over time will induce the insured to invest in safety in a way that partial coverage will not. Therefore, we conduct a set of standard tests to determine whether reinsurance intensity is correlated with actual claim experience. We do so by employing the time-series test for joint autocorrelation in the reinsurance demand and loss ratio models. These tests are similar to those suggested by Chiappori and Salanie, 22 but in a time-series context. Our specific tests involve estimating both the reinsurance demand model (which is described more fully in the section "Reinsurance demand equation (for testing Hypothesis 1)") and the loss realization model (using the 3-year ceded reinsurance underwriting ratio as the dependent variable with the same explanatory variables used in the reinsurance demand model). Residuals from these models were captured and multiplied for each observation. Intuitively, if prediction errors for both the demand model and the underwriting performance move consistently in the same direction, there is reason to believe that insurance demand and risk-taking are jointly determined (that is, information asymmetry problems are not mitigated by any of the explanatory variables). However, if the prediction errors diverge frequently, then there is evidence that reinsurers may be learning over time and adjusting premiums and reinsurance capacity appropriately. By multiplying the residuals from each observation in both the reinsurance demand model and the loss realization model, we can determine whether 20 Since our data are time-series in nature, autocorrelation is a potential problem. While we report heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors, unreported standard errors pooled by cedant were not materially different. 21 Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . 22 Chiappori and Salanie (2000) . prediction errors move in the same direction, as the product will be positive when the residuals are simultaneously either positive or negative. If the prediction errors move in the opposite direction, then reinsurance demand and loss realization are not jointly determined, and information asymmetry problems are not present.
The first test uses a t-test to determine whether the product of residuals is significantly different from zero. Formally, the null hypothesis is that information asymmetry will generate prediction errors in the same direction, so the average product of residuals is positive. The alternative hypothesis is that information asymmetry has been mitigated and the average product of residuals is non-positive.
In Table 2 , Panel A, we report t-test results for the product of the residuals for the models using both Sustainability3 and Sustainability5. The t-test results indicate a negative and significant result, suggesting that the residuals for each model have opposite signs more frequently than similar signs. This provides support for the alternative hypothesis that information asymmetry has been mitigated. Indeed, the negative and significant result suggests that information asymmetry is falling. In the second test, we use the product of residuals as the dependent variable and the sustainability measure as the explanatory variable. In another specification, we include a time trend as an explanatory variable. The null hypothesis (information asymmetry effects are correlated with sustainability) would be supported by a positive coefficient on sustainability. The alternative hypothesis (information asymmetry effects are mitigated by sustained contracts) would be supported by a negative coefficient on sustainability.
In Table 2 , Panel B, we report the results of regressions in which the dependent variable is the product of the residuals and the explanatory variables are Sustainability3 and Sustainability5, respectively. The results are similar in models that include a time trend. In each specification, the coefficient on our sustainability measures are not significantly different from zero, providing support for the alternative hypothesis that information asymmetry problems have been mitigated. These results provide a basis for exploring the specific hypotheses proposed by Jean-Baptiste and Santomero, which we explore in the balance of this section. 
Reinsurance demand equation (for testing Hypothesis 1)
Since we wish to study the effects that reinsurance sustainability and concentration have upon the demand for reinsurance, we are particularly interested in the coefficients and standard errors associated with these variables. However, we must also control for other determinants of the demand for reinsurance that have been documented by previous empirical studies. 15 Thus, our regression also includes the following set of right-hand side control variables in addition to reinsurance sustainability and concentration:
• ProductHerfindahl = product Herfindahl index-measures the extent to which the cedant's lines of business are focused or diffuse.
• GeographicHerfindahl = geographic Herfindahl index-measures the extent to which the cedant's business operations are geographically concentrated or dispersed.
• CedantSize = natural logarithm of the cedant's total assets.
• PremiumSurplusRatio = premium to surplus ratio definitionpremium to surplus ratio, calculated as the ratio of the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed, divided by the cedant's surplus.
• CashFlowVolatility = cash flow volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of the cedant's assets and liabilities.
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• Liquidity = percentage of cedant's assets that are liquid, calculated as the ratio of cash plus short-term investments divided by total admitted assets. 23 We analysed numerous unreported specifications of this model and found no evidence of positive correlation in any of the models, further supporting our contention that information asymmetries are not growing over time. 24 Here, we follow the cash flow volatility calculation method given by Cummins and Sommer (1996) .
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• PercentLongtail = proportion of the cedant's premiums written in long tail lines.
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• PercentAuthorized = percentage of reinsurance premiums ceded to authorized reinsurers.
• StockDummy = stock indicator variable, which equals 1 if the cedant is a stock insurer, 0 otherwise.
• ReciprocalDummy = reciprocal indicator variable, which equals 1 if the cedant is a reciprocal insurer, 0 otherwise.
• GroupDummy = group indicator variable, which equals 1 if the cedant is a member of an insurance group, 0 otherwise.
• CedantTaxRate = cedant's tax rate = 1-NetIncome t /BeforeTaxNetIncome t , where NetIncome t = period t after-tax net income and BeforeTaxNetIncome t = period t before-tax net income.
We also interact cedant size (CedantSize) with the reinsurance sustainability (Sustainability) and reinsurance Herfindahl (ReinsuranceHerfindahl) variables, 26 the reinsurance Herfindahl variable (ReinsuranceHerfindahl) with the group indicator (GroupDummy), 27 and control for non-linearities by squaring the firm size (CedantSize), 28 tax rate (CedantTaxRate), 29 and cash flow volatility (CashFlowVolatility) variables. 30 Finally, we use a 1-year lagged (rather than contemporaneous) value for both the 5-year and 3-year reinsurance sustainability indices; thus we model the cedant insurer as basing its decision to purchase reinsurance in period t upon the extent to which it has previously (as of period t−1) engaged in long-term implicit contracting with its reinsurers. 25 We define long tail lines in the same manner as Phillips et al. (1998) 26 This interaction effect enables us to calibrate whether relationship sustainability and focus have different reinsurance demand implications for large vs small firms; we find that other things equal, reinsurance demand is positively influenced by relationship sustainability and focus, although the effect is smaller for large compared with small firms. 27 By interacting ReinsuranceHerfindahl with GroupDummy, this allows us to differentiate somewhat between reinsurance contracts that take place within groups with reinsurance contracts that take place outside of groups. 28 The basic intuition for squaring firm size is to determine whether there may be scale economies in risk bearing that make reinsurance marginally less attractive for large firms compared with small firms. 29 This approach (i.e. including CedantTaxRate and CedantTaxRate 2 as right-hand side variables) is consistent with approaches followed in a number of studies that have empirically investigated the implications of tax convexity for reinsurance demand; for example see Adiel (1996) , Adams et al. (2008) , and Kader et al. (2010) . 30 This enables us to calibrate whether the marginal effect of volatility is different at high compared with low levels of volatility; we find that other things equal, reinsurance demand is higher (lower) at higher (lower) levels of volatility.
Profitability equations (for testing Hypothesis 2)
We measure cedant profitability by calculating ReturnOnAssets (after-tax return on (admitted) assets) and ReturnOnEquity (after-tax return on equity (surplus)) and use these measures as left-hand side variables for our profitability equations. Although we are primarily interested in studying how reinsurance sustainability (Sustainability) and focus (ReinsuranceHerfindahl ) affect cedant profitability, we also control for various other variables that are known to be important determinants of insurer profitability.
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For example, Lamm-Tennant et al. 32 show that net underwriting profit is significantly related to ownership structure, with stock insurers being more profitable (and riskier) on average than mutual insurers. Therefore we include the stock (StockDummy), reciprocal (ReciprocalDummy), and group (GroupDummy) indicator variables, as these variables capture important differences in ownership structure.
Furthermore, Berger et al. 33 find that independent agency firms are less costefficient than direct writers, although this does not result in profit inefficiencies. Thus we include indicator variables for the type of distribution system employed by the cedant insurers in our sample. Specifically, we include an indicator variable called AgencyDummy that equals 1 if the cedant insurer employs an independent agent marketing system and 0 otherwise, along with another indicator variable called DirectDummy that equals 1 if the cedant insurer employs a direct writer marketing system and 0 otherwise. 34 Firm size is included because of the possibility that economies or diseconomies of scale could affect profitability. Since the financial pricing model literature 35 shows that differences in average claim delays across lines of business create a trade-off between investment income and underwriting profitability, we control for this trade-off by including the PercentLongtail variable that measures percentage of premiums written in long tail lines of business. We also interact firm size with the stock indicator variable (StockDummy), the reinsurance Herfindahl index (ReinsuranceHerfindahl), and reinsurance sustainability index (Sustainability), and test for non-linearities by including squared values of the premium to surplus ratio (PremiumSurplusRatio), firm size (CedantSize), and cash flow volatility (CashFlowVolatility). 31 In the profitability and bankruptcy risk equations, we utilize the contemporaneous rather than 1-year lagged values for our Sustainability and Sustainability3 variables. This is appropriate since profitability and insurer rating outcomes depend upon the current status of the cedant firm's reinsurance program. 32 Lamm-Tennant et al. (1996) . 33 Berger et al. (1997) . 34 Thus, the reference variable for type of distribution system is the broker marketing system (see Hilliard et al. (2013) , etc., and they record the letter rating for each firm i in each year t. For the purposes of this study, we assign the various A. M. Best financial strength ratings to a variable called AMBestRating that has numerical scores ranging from 1 to 15. The following list provides the numbering scheme for the various rating categories:
• If the insurer falls within the various A rating categories; that is A ++ , A + , A, and A − , then it is assigned scores of 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
• If the insurer falls within the various B rating categories; that is B ++ , B + , B, and B − , then it is assigned scores of 5, 6, 7, and 8, respectively.
• If the insurer falls within the various C rating categories; that is C ++ , C + , C, and C − , then it is assigned scores of 9, 10, 11, and 12, respectively.
• If the insurer falls within the D, E, or F rating categories, then it is assigned a score of 13.
• If the insurer is not assigned a rating, then it is assigned a score of 15.
We estimate the bankruptcy risk equation using an ordered probit model. The ordered probit model is appropriate because there are only 14 possible discrete values that can be assumed by the left-hand side variable, ranging from 1 (high) to 15 (low). Consequently, ordinary least squares (OLS) should not be used since it would produce inefficient coefficient estimates. Furthermore, a fixed or random effects model is inappropriate here since the firm identifiers are collinear with the A. M. Best rating.
We follow the lead of Lamm-Tennant et al. 32 in our selection of the right-hand side control variables for the bankruptcy risk equation. Lamm-Tennant et al show that liquidity and capital adequacy are important determinants of insurer bankruptcies, as are the asset-liability management strategies employed by such firms. Thus our bankruptcy risk regression equation employs the (Liquidity) variable referenced in the section "Reinsurance demand equation (for testing Hypothesis 1)", in order to control for differences in liquidity among the cedant companies represented in our data set. We empirically control for capital adequacy by including the premium to surplus ratio (PremiumSurplusRatio) as well as the percentage change in surplus from the prior year variable (PctChgSurplus). 36 Finally, cash flow volatility (CashFlowVolatility) is included since it is the standard deviation of cedant's portfolio of assets and liabilities and therefore provides a summary statistic 36 By using both PremiumSurplusRatio and PctChgSurplus we are able to provide a more dynamic view of bankruptcy risk; that is, PremiumSurplusRatio indicates whether the cedant is currently adequately capitalized, whereas PctChgSurplus indicates where capital adequacy is either improving or deteriorating from its current level.
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Empirical results
Summary statistics
The summary statistics for our sample are provided in Reinsurance equation Table 3 presents our regression results for our reinsurance equation described above. We estimated a firm fixed effects model using CededReinsurance (as defined (1)) as our dependent variable. As we noted earlier, the model shown in Table  3 tests for the relationship between reinsurance demand (as measured by CededReinsurance) and reinsurance sustainability (as measured by the 5-year and 3-year versions of Sustainability; labelled in Table 3 as Sustainability5 and Sustainability3, respectively) as well as the relationship between reinsurance demand and reinsurance focus (as measured by ReinsuranceHerfindahl), after controlling for various firmspecific factors. These factors include line of business and geographic characteristics (PercentLongtail, ProductHerfindahl, and GeographicHerfindahl), ownership structure (StockDummy, ReciprocalDummy, and GroupDummy), firm size (CedantSize), leverage (PremiumSurplusRatio), reinsurer credit quality (AMBestRating), risk of the cedant (CashFlowVolatility and Liquidity), and the cedant's effective tax rate (CedantTaxRate), with additional interaction terms based upon size, sustainability, ownership structure, risk, and taxes.
The regression results reported in Table 3 confirm Hypothesis 1. Other things equal, the higher Sustainability and ReinsuranceHerfindahl are, the higher CededReinsurance is; that is long-term and focused contracting relationships with reinsurers are associated with higher levels of reinsurance coverage, consistent with expectations regarding the positive effects of repeated interactions for reducing adverse selection. The somewhat weaker relationship in the 5-year sustainability specification suggests that the benefits of sustained relationships are mitigated over time by other factors. Other control variables that emerge as significant include GeographicHerfindahl (negative and significant in both specifications, indicating that reinsurance demand decreases in geographic focus) and PremiumSurplusRatio, suggesting that firms with higher business risk also demand more reinsurance. The linear relationship between CashFlowVolatility and reinsurance demand is also significant and negative, suggesting the firms with more volatile balance sheets demand less reinsurance. However, the quadratic relationship between reinsurance demand and cash flow volatility is positive and significant, indicating that at higher levels of balance sheet volatility, the relationship between reinsurance demand and balance sheet volatility is positive, in line with most prior literature about insurance demand.
When examining interaction effects, we find that the joint effect of sustainability and firm size (CedantSize) is negative and significant, suggesting that larger firms benefit less from repeated contracts. Similarly, the joint effect of reinsurer concentration (ReinsuranceHerfindahl) and firm size is negative, suggesting that reinsurance demand is lower for large firms that rely on a concentrated group of reinsurers. However, group members' demand for reinsurance increases in reinsurer concentration, as measured by the interaction between ReinsuranceHerfindahl and the group member indicator.
Examining the marginal effects provided in Table 3 , Panel B, we see that the mean marginal impact of sustainability is not significant. This suggests that the slope on sustainability is constant at the mean. However, the marginal effects on ReinsuranceHerfindahl and PremiumSurplusRatio are positive at the means, suggesting that
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Both the model testing the 5-year version of Sustainability (i.e. Sustainability5) as well as the robustness test examining the 3-year version of Sustainability (i.e. Sustainability3) have reasonably strong R 2 values, suggesting that between 17 and 19 per cent of the variation in reinsurance demand is explained by these regressions. Table 4 presents the results of our firm fixed effects estimations of the profitability equations. We estimate two different models; one uses ReturnOnAssets as the dependent variable, whereas the other uses ReturnOnEquity.
Profitability equations
Recall our second hypothesis: other things equal, insurers become more profitable as the length of the cedant-reinsurer relationship increases. The regression results reported in Table 4 confirm Hypothesis 2. Other things equal, longer-term (as well as more focused) contracting relationships with reinsurers are associated with higher levels profitability. Panel B of Table 4 indicates that for the average firm in our sample, there is little relationship between profitability (as indicated by ReturnOnAssets and ReturnOnEquity alike) and our Sustainability5, Sustainability3, and ReinsuranceHerfindahl variables. While the signs on each sustainability variable are positive, only the 5-year sustainability variable is significant at the 10 per cent level. There appears to be no definitive relationship between profitability and reinsurer focus. Thus, while we are not able to assert a definitive positive relationship between sustainability and profitability, neither do we find evidence of an inverse relationship.
We also tested the impact of other variables believed to influence firm profitability yielded similarly anticipated results, after controlling for reinsurance sustainability and focus. In particular, PremiumSurplusRatio illustrates a negative effect on profit (linear for profit measured by ROA and quadratic for profit measured by ROE). Cedants that primarily distribute through agents have lower ROA profitability, consistent with earlier literature.
Marginal effects shown in Table 4 , Panel B, demonstrate that the marginal effect of size on profitability is indeed positive, though not significant. As shown above, firm underwriting risk measured by PremiumSurplusRatio indicates a negative linear relationship between risk and profit measured by ROA, but the squared term reveals a non-linear relationship for profit measured by ROE. The marginal effects reported in Panel B show that the negative relationship persists for the average firm. Bankruptcy risk equation Table 5 shows the ordered probit estimates for the bankruptcy risk equation. In this model we analyse the effect of Sustainability (and Sustainability3) on A. M. Best ratings. Our third hypothesis was that firms with longer reinsurance sustainability would have a lower risk of bankruptcy. In this case, we use the A. M. Best credit rating as a proxy for bankruptcy risk. We compress the various ratings into a 15-point ordinal scale as discussed earlier with "1" being the highest and "15" being the lowest. One-tailed test results indicated by: *** P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1. Notes: Coefficients for cedant and year indicator variables are omitted for clarity of presentation. The model labelled Sustainability5 uses the contemporaneous 5-year sustainability index and the model labelled Sustainability3 uses the contemporaneous 3-year sustainability index. Marginal effects are measured at the means for continuous variables and levels for indicator variables to illustrate the sensitivity of terms used in interactions. The model labelled Sustainability5 uses the contemporaneous 5-year sustainability index and the model labelled Sustainability3 uses the contemporaneous 3-year sustainability index.
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Again, our hypothesis is a one-tailed test (that sustainability will have a positive effect on credit rating) and under this test, the result is significant at the .05 level. In addition, our measure of focus is highly significant and negative, which suggests a penalty for lack of reinsurance monitoring, other things equal.
The ordered probit model reveals largely anticipated relationships between bankruptcy risk and the other predicted independent variables. For example, reinsurer concentration is negatively related to cedant credit quality. Indeed, relying more on a small number of reinsurers increases counterparty risk for the cedant that impacts their own presumed bankruptcy risk. Increased risk related to capitalization (measured by PremiumSurplusRatio) shows that bankruptcy risk increases in leverage. Firms that are growing their surplus, as anticipated, decrease their bankruptcy risk and large firms are deemed less likely to fail than small firms. Firm operating risk, represented by Liquidity, PercentLongtail, and CashFlowVolatility, all further confirm that prediction that firms engaging in risky behaviour are deemed more likely to face financial distress.
Since the relatively small amount of firm-level variation in ratings over time prevent controlling for unobserved firm-level variables, we implement a robustness test that provides additional support for our findings. Specifically, we use Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) solvency ratios and insurer failure data to estimate the probability of failure over time. IRIS ratios provide early warning signals to insurance regulators and have been used in prior studies, including Grace and Leverty. 39 We collected insurance firm failures from 1995 to 2012 and collected or calculated IRIS ratios from the SNL database. We also added firm size (CedantSize) and an indicator for mutual companies. Using these variables, we calculate the probability of failure using a discrete-time hazard model, where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the insurer is insolvent in either year t+1 or t+2, following Shumway. 40 We identify 237 firm failures within our useful data set of 17,227 firm-years and 3,106 individual firms. The average predicted failure for the entire data set is 1.38 per cent with a standard deviation of 2.60 per cent. The mean probability of failure for firms that did not ultimately fail was 1.34 per cent (2.39 per cent) and the mean probability of failure for firms that ultimately did fail was 4.28 per cent (8.50 per cent). 41 Results for the hazard model and summary statistics about predicted probability of insolvency are presented in Table 6 .
After estimating the probability of failure for each firm, we use that predicted probability as the dependent variable in an OLS regression employing the same explanatory variables as the ordered probit model. Because the predicted values are point estimates only, we bootstrap the regression (10,000 iterations) and include cedant and year fixed effects. The predictions for the effect of contract sustainability are presented in Table 7 and are similar in sign to those of the ordered probit model, although the model lacks significance for the sustainability measure. Due to the limited sample size for the robustness test and the potential errors in variables bias, it is not surprising that significance is lacking, but these results do not invalidate those of the A.M. Best ratings models.
Robustness tests
To determine whether our results are driven by model specification, we conduct a series of robustness tests. Essentially, these tests involve estimating a series of regressions that omit variables that may drive the results we observe. For both the reinsurance demand and profit hypotheses, we estimate models that omit non-linear terms, dummy variable terms, and then one of the variables of interest (in this case, Sustainability5 and ReinsuranceHerfindahl).
42 If the coefficient estimates differ significantly from those in the previously reported model, we look to the F-test to compare the unrestricted, original model with the restricted model. The null hypothesis is that the omitted variables in the restricted models add no explanatory power to unrestricted model. For the reinsurance demand equation, robustness tests are reported in Table 8 . In this table, only the first restricted model generates markedly different results from the unrestricted model. Both of these restricted models remove the non-linear (quadratic and interaction) terms. The rationale for including these non-linear terms is explained more fully in a prior section. Indeed, the model is weaker when the non-linear terms are omitted, as suggested by the significant F-statistic in each of these tables. The other restricted models reported in these tables also show similar evidence that the omitted variables add explanatory power to the models, but the coefficients on the variables of interest in these restricted models do not differ materially from that of the unrestricted model.
In Tables 9 and 10 , we report results for alternative model specifications for the profitability models in a similar manner to those reported for the reinsurance demand One-tail test significance: ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1. Note: Coefficients for cedant and year indicator variables are omitted for clarity of presentation. The F-test compares the restricted model with the unrestricted model and is compared against a critical value with k numerator degrees of freedom and n−k denominator degrees of freedom where k is the number of dropped variables in the restricted model and n is the number of cedants. One-tail test significance: ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1. Note: Coefficients for cedant and year indicator variables are omitted for clarity of presentation. The F-test compares the restricted model with the unrestricted model and is compared against a critical value with k numerator degrees of freedom and n−k denominator degrees of freedom where k is the number of dropped variables in the restricted model and n is the number of cedants.
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review One-tail test significance: ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1. Note: Coefficients for cedant and year indicator variables are omitted for clarity of presentation. The F-test compares the restricted model with the unrestricted model and is compared against a critical value with k numerator degrees of freedom and n−k denominator degrees of freedom where k is the number of dropped variables in the restricted model and n is the number of cedants. models. None of these restricted models differ materially from the unrestricted model, and the F-tests suggest that in most cases, the models are not improved by adding these additional variables that are inspired by theory. Interestingly, the fourth restricted model in each of these tables drops the sustainability measure. In both the ROA and ROE tests, the sustainability variable actually does improve the models, providing further support for our inclusion of this newly identified measure of reinsurer relationship intensity.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined three hypotheses inspired by Jean-Baptiste and Santomero concerning how long-term repeated contracting between cedants and reinsurers influence the demand for reinsurance, insurer profitability, and solvency. We also empirically examined a related issue; specifically, how the degree to which the ceding insurer tends to have "focused" vs diffuse contractual relationships with its reinsurers impacts the demand for reinsurance, insurer profitability, and solvency. Subject to the potential for reverse causality and omitted variable bias, we find that long-term repeated contracting with reinsurers (as measured by our Sustainability variables), along with "focused" reinsurer relationships are associated with higher levels of reinsurance coverage, higher insurer profitability, and lower risk of bankruptcy, other things equal. We also note that, following Jean-Baptiste and Santomero, we take the presence of the insurance contracts as given, and analyse the impact of contract sustainability in improving the contract terms for both parties. Analysis of ex-ante contract design is beyond the scope of this study. In conclusion, our paper provides an important contribution to the empirical adverse selection literature by empirically examining the financial consequences of mitigating adverse selection via long-term and focused cedant-reinsurer relationships.
Numerical example of the reinsurance sustainability index Example #1: In this second numerical example, since
Count i;2 ¼ 1 3 2 + 1 + 2 ð Þ¼1:67
